The Impact of Dynamic Feedback and Personal Budgets on Arousal and Funding Behaviour in Participatory Budgeting

Claudia Niemeyer, Timm Teubner, Margeret Hall, Christof Weinhardt

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Public institutions as well as corporations seek to engage their constituents and employees in participatory processes to enhance engagement in decision-making. This paper proposes a group decision method of fusing crowdfunding and participatory budget allocation. In this approach, a central institution lets their members decide over budget allocation by endowing members with individual budgets. Participants are free to allocate their budgets to projects. A project is realized if its respective cost threshold is surpassed. We evaluate different design parameters of such mechanisms for group decisions and, based on this, the allocation of institutional budgets within a controlled laboratory experiment. The first design parameter is feedback on funding status, which can either be static (a one-shot decision, simultaneous funding) or dynamic (sequential decisions, repeated funding with continuous feedback). The second variable refers to the fraction of budget that may be kept privately by individuals and is not forfeit if not assigned to projects. Building on threshold public goods literature, we investigate how these parameters affect participants’ investment behaviour, their excitement, and overall welfare. We find that mechanisms including feedback net higher welfare gains as well as higher levels of arousal. Higher personal budget shares drive excitement but lead to lower welfare gains.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)611-636
Number of pages26
JournalGroup Decision and Negotiation
Volume27
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2018

Fingerprint

Budget control
budget
funding
Feedback
group decision
welfare
Decision making
Personnel
investment behavior
public institution
laboratory experiment
Participatory budgeting
Funding
Arousal
Costs
Industry
Experiments
corporation
employee
decision making

Keywords

  • Arousal
  • Laboratory experiment
  • Participatory budgeting
  • Threshold public goods

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

Cite this

The Impact of Dynamic Feedback and Personal Budgets on Arousal and Funding Behaviour in Participatory Budgeting. / Niemeyer, Claudia; Teubner, Timm; Hall, Margeret; Weinhardt, Christof.

In: Group Decision and Negotiation, Vol. 27, No. 4, 01.08.2018, p. 611-636.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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