The buck stops here

Trust management in multi-agent systems with accountability

Bilal Khan, Dardo D. Kleiner, David Talmage

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Much of security in multi-agent systems is based on models where each agent declares limits on what other agents are permitted to receive. Traditional systems are engineered to operate without violating their agents ' cumulative declared constraints. In contrast, here we consider a trust model that is suited for use by ensembles of closely coupled agents operating in a system supporting agent accountability using audit trails for information flows. In such systems, an agent does not require enforcement of absolute limits on the what other agents receive, but instead seeks assurance that its personal liabilities will never exceed its declared risk tolerance. In short, each agent expects the system to behave in a manner which respects its declared accountability constraints -quantitative limits on what the agent agrees to be held accountable for sending. This paper outlines a suite of protocols with which a multi-agent system can fulfill the cumulative accountability constraints of its constituent agents, and avoid subjecting any individual agent to greater liability than its declared risk tolerance. The protocols are shown to be efficient in a dynamic network setting, and are analyzed under a comprehensive set of failure models including link delay, link failure, and limited corruption in the control and data processing logic of agents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability
Pages46-54
Number of pages9
StatePublished - Dec 1 2004
Event2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability - Drexel, PA, United States
Duration: Aug 30 2004Aug 31 2004

Publication series

Name2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability

Other

Other2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability
CountryUnited States
CityDrexel, PA
Period8/30/048/31/04

Fingerprint

Multi agent systems

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Khan, B., Kleiner, D. D., & Talmage, D. (2004). The buck stops here: Trust management in multi-agent systems with accountability. In 2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability (pp. 46-54). (2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability).

The buck stops here : Trust management in multi-agent systems with accountability. / Khan, Bilal; Kleiner, Dardo D.; Talmage, David.

2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability. 2004. p. 46-54 (2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Khan, B, Kleiner, DD & Talmage, D 2004, The buck stops here: Trust management in multi-agent systems with accountability. in 2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability. 2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability, pp. 46-54, 2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability, Drexel, PA, United States, 8/30/04.
Khan B, Kleiner DD, Talmage D. The buck stops here: Trust management in multi-agent systems with accountability. In 2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability. 2004. p. 46-54. (2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability).
Khan, Bilal ; Kleiner, Dardo D. ; Talmage, David. / The buck stops here : Trust management in multi-agent systems with accountability. 2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability. 2004. pp. 46-54 (2004 IEEE 1st Symposium on Multi-Agent Security and Survivability).
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