Social contact patterns can buffer costs of forgetting in the evolution of cooperation

Jeffrey R Stevens, Jan K. Woike, Lael J. Schooler, Stefan Lindner, Thorsten Pachur

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Analyses of the evolution of cooperation often rely on two simplifying assumptions: (i) individuals interact equally frequently with all social network members and (ii) they accurately remember each partner’s past cooperation or defection. Here, we examine how more realistic, skewed patterns of contact— in which individuals interact primarily with only a subset of their network’s members—influence cooperation. In addition, we test whether skewed contact patterns can counteract the decrease in cooperation caused by memory errors (i.e. forgetting). Finally, we compare two types of memory error that vary in whether forgotten interactions are replaced with random actions or with actions from previous encounters. We use evolutionary simulations of repeated prisoner’s dilemma games that vary agents’ contact patterns, forgetting rates and types of memory error. We find that highly skewed contact patterns foster cooperation and also buffer the detrimental effects of forgetting. The type of memory error used also influences cooperation rates. Our findings reveal previously neglected but important roles of contact pattern, type of memory error and the interaction of contact pattern and memory on cooperation. Although cognitive limitations may constrain the evolution of cooperation, social contact patterns can counteract some of these constraints.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number20180407
JournalProceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Volume285
Issue number1880
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 13 2018

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Buffers
buffers
Data storage equipment
Costs and Cost Analysis
cost
Costs
social networks
prisoner dilemma
Social Support
co-operation
social network
testing
simulation

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Forgetting
  • Memory
  • Reciprocity
  • Social contact
  • Social network

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Immunology and Microbiology(all)
  • Environmental Science(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)

Cite this

Social contact patterns can buffer costs of forgetting in the evolution of cooperation. / Stevens, Jeffrey R; Woike, Jan K.; Schooler, Lael J.; Lindner, Stefan; Pachur, Thorsten.

In: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Vol. 285, No. 1880, 20180407, 13.06.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Stevens, Jeffrey R ; Woike, Jan K. ; Schooler, Lael J. ; Lindner, Stefan ; Pachur, Thorsten. / Social contact patterns can buffer costs of forgetting in the evolution of cooperation. In: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 2018 ; Vol. 285, No. 1880.
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